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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Is an appeal from the final order of the Fourth 
District Court, upon a Jury Verdict, convicting defendant 
Holyoak of possession of cocaine, a third degree felony* (R. 
78, and 85-86). 
This appeal is brought from the Trial Court's failure to 
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to execution of the Search 
Warrant on the grounds that the Warrant was issued upon a 
defective hearsay affidavit, the Trial Court's failure to order 
Disclosure of the "confidential informant," and the Trial Court's 
failure to interview the "confidential informant" in camera to 
verify his existence and the information given to Affiant. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The cocaine which constituted the evidence upon which 
Holyoak was convicted was siezed pursuant to a search warrant. 
(R. 7-8). The search warrant was issued upon and supported by a 
hearsay Affidavit of Officer Brad Leatham, which contained 
allegations as allegedly provided by a "confidential informant." 
(R. 11-12). The Affidavit provided, in pertinent part: 
2. On the 14th day of January, 1986, I received 
information from a confidential informant that Robert 
P. Holyoak is in possession of a large amount of 
cocaine at the address of 414 East 200 South, Provo, 
Utah. 
3. That said Informant has proven his reli-
ability in the past four months. 
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4. That within the last 24 hours said informant 
did observe what appeared to be at least one ounce of 
cocaine in the residence at 414 East 200 South. 
7. That said Robert Holyoak has in the past 
been convicted of sales of cocaine and has also been 
charged with possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. 
8. Information from a second confidential 
Informant states that Robert Holyoak distributes a 
large amount of cocaine, . . . " 
Record on Appeal, at 11-12. 
The police Officer testified that the informant had actually 
been in the house "this morning," (January 14, 1986). Transcript 
of Suppression Hearing, p. 20 lines 10-16. Defendant and his 
roommate testified that no one had been in the house that morning 
and alleged that the Informant did not exist. Infra. 
Defendant Holyoak moved the Court to suppress the evidence 
obtained by execution of the warrant, on the grounds that the 
informant's veracity and basis of knowledge was inadequate and 
the corroboration was defective, in the alternative to disclose 
the identity of the "confidential informant" (R. 16-27), or for 
the Court to conduct an in camera informant Interview. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on the Issues presented in 
defendant Holyoak1s motions. At that hearing it was determined 
that the "confidential informant" listed in paragraph two of the 
Affidavit, was in fact a criminal informant, and that Officer 
Leatham had agreed to drop criminal charges against the Informant 
in exchange for information. Transcript of Suppression Hearing, 
-2-
at p. 10, 1. 15-21. In addition, Officer Leatham admitted that 
he did not obtain any additional information from the corrob-
orating informant, as provided in paragraph eight. Officer 
Leatham also admitted that the information in paragraph seven, 
that "Said Robert Holyoak has in the past been convicted of sales 
of cocaine . . .," was false. Id. p. 11, 1. 8-21. Officer 
Leatham admitted that paragraph two was false, Defendant Holyoak 
was not "in possession of a large amount of cocaine." Id. p. 22, 
1. 18. The "corroborating informant" did not corroborate that 
there was cocaine in Holyoak's house. Id. p. 24, 1. 20-23. 
Defendant Holyoak testified at the suppression hearing that 
he remembered the incidents of the day of the search and arrest 
and that no one had been in his house that morning that he was 
aware of. That he woke up around 11:00 a.m., and came to his 
attorney's office, and returned home around 1:30 p.m. Holyoak's 
car was broken, so he called a friend to come help fix it and the 
friend came to his house around 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. By then 
the search warrant and affidavit had been prepared and issued. 
Id. at p. 27, lines 2 through 23. He also testified that he was 
not aware of anyone in the house within 24 hours preceedlng the 
Issuance of the warrant. 
Defendant's roommate, Donna Alex, testified at the suppres-
sion hearing. Her testimony was that she got up that morning 
around 8:30 a.m. Her sister-in-law came over that morning, but 
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the sister-in-law could not be the Informant because she had 
never been charged with any cocaine violations. Donna Alex was 
home the entire day until 4:30 p.m., no one else was in the home 
that day and no one the day before. Id. at p.31* line 21 to p. 
33, line 4. 
The affidavit of Officer Leatham provides that the "confi-
dential informant" was a male. R. 11, paragraph 4. 
The Court denied defendant Holyoak's motion to suppress 
evidence, denied defendant Holyoak's motion to disclose the 
"Confidential Informant," and denied defendant Holyoak's motion 
requesting the Court to examine the "Confidential Informant" in 
camera, in order to verify the information contained In the 
Affidavit and the informant's existence. 
C. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Hearsay Affidavit in support of the Search Warrant 
in this case was defective and did not establish probable cause 
pursuant to Utah State and Federal law, and therefore, the 
evidence obtained by execution of the search warrant should have 
been suppressed. 
2. Defendant was entitled to disclosure of the "Confi-
dential Informant" in order to prepare his defense. 
3* Where Defendant had made a substantial preliminary 
showing that the "Confidential Informant" did not exist, and 
where the Court will not order disclosure of the Informant, the 
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Trial Court should conduct in camera examinations of the 
informant as a due process safeguard. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT 1; 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT A SEARCH WARRANT WAS ABSENT 
Article 1 §14, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden-Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
In addition, Art. 1 §12 provides that any criminal accused 
shall have the right "to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, . . ." 
A. THE "POLICE INFORMER" AND THE "CITIZEN INFORMER" 
The courts have recognized the necessity of allowing Hearsay 
Affidavits In support of search warrants. McCray v. Illinois, 
386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). In this 
arena, the courts have also recognized the difference between the 
so-called "citizen informant" and the criminal or "police 
informant." 
Recent case law has acknowledged that a different 
rationale exists for establishing the reliability of 
named citizen informers as opposed to unnamed police 
informers, who are frequently criminals. Those in the 
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latter category often proffer Information In exchange 
for some concession, payment, or simply out of revenge 
against the subject; under such circumstances, It Is 
proper to demand some evidence of their credibility or 
reliability, *** The courts, therefore, treat citizen-
Informers differently and their testimony Is not viewed 
with the rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of a police 
informer. (emphasis added) 
State v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846 (Utah 1972), at 848. 
In this case, the confidential informant was a criminal with 
whom Officer Leatham had made a "deal" to drop criminal charges 
in exchange for his help herein. The courts, in attempting to 
establish what constitutes sufficient scrutiny for "police 
informers," have established criteria based upon the "veracity" 
or "reliability" of the "police informant." It was this problem 
which led to the socalled Agullar/Spinelll tests. Aguilar-
Spinelli has since been over-ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Gates, infra), and by the Utah Supreme Court (Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258 (1983). However, the requirement of "reliability" and 
"veracity" still exist. See: State v. Bally, Infra. 
It is generally recognized that criminal Informants are 
unreliable, and on that basis, the courts require additional 
indicia of reliability, or corroboration of information. It 
should also be noted that there are two types of "police 
informers," the named and known Informer, and the unnamed 
"confidential informer." The unnamed informer is nore suspect 
than the named informer. The additional information necessary to 
establish the "veracity" of the informer and his "reliability" 
-6-
were lacking In this case. 
B. APPLICATION OP AGUILAR-SPINELLI, IN LIGHT OP GATES, AND 
ANDERTON; 
The U.S. Supreme Court set forth a test of constitutionality 
of "police informant" hearsay warrants in Splnelll v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed.2d 637. (The so-
called Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test). Although Splnelll has 
since been over ruled, both at the state and federal levels, the 
case provides some guidance as provided below. 
United States Supreme Court "retreated" from the holding of 
Splnelll and Agullar, in the case of Illinois v. Gates, 103 
S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) the Court held: 
...we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the 
"two-pronged test" established by our decisions in 
Agullar and Splnelll. In its place we reaffirm the 
totality of the circumstances analysis that tradit-
ionally has informed probable cause determinations. 
The task...is simply to make a practical commonsense 
decision ...including "veracity" and "basis of know-
ledge" of persons supplying hearsay Information..." 
The Supreme Court did not hold that veracity and basis of 
knowledge were unnecessary, to the contrary, the Court stated 
that "[a]n Informants "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of 
knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of 
his report." Therefore, the guidelines established subsequent to 
Agullar and Splnelll provide us with guidance in this case. The 
Court merely held in Gates, that the "totality of circumstances" 
allowed probable cause to be established by combining all the 
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facts, and allowing defects In one area to be supported by 
additional facts in another. (ffa defect In one may be 
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, 
by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of 
reliability"). 
The general rule is that the "basis of knowledge" may be 
proved by (1) "I saw it," (2) "He showed it to me," or (3) "He 
told me it was there." 
In this case we have none of the above. The Officer 
provided that "during the past 24 hours said informant did 
observe what appeared to be at least one ounce of cocaine in the 
residence at 414 East 200 South." (R. 11 14). At the 
Suppression Hearing the Officer did not testify that it was 
cocaine, only that "it appeared to [him to] be." In addition, 
the Officer testified that paragraph 4 was false there was not 
"at least one ounce of cocaine in" defendant Holyoak's house. 
There was less than one gram of cocaine found. 
The Court may take Judicial Notice that many things "appear" 
to be cocaine, flour, powdered milk, baby powder, corn starch, 
coffee creamer, powdered sugar, baking soda, and many other 
common household items. 
The Officer admitted at the Suppression Hearing that 
paragraph two of his affidavit was false, in that Holyoak was not 
in "possession of a large amount of cocaine..." (Reliability?) 
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The rule is that basis of knowledge may be supported by 
other facts supporting upon what basis the knowledge is 
determined. "('What are the raw facts upon which the informant 
based his conclusion?" "How did the informant obtain those 
facts?" "What precisely did he see or hear or smell or touch 
firsthand?" "If he heard the facts from someone else, what makes 
that third person 'credible' and how did that third person come 
by the knowledge?1)" Stanley v. State, 19 Md.App. 508, 313 A.2d 
847 (1974). 
If there is no showing of direct knowledge, it may be 
possible to assume a sufficient basis of knowledge from the 
wealth of detail which has been provided. 
"The detail provided by the informant in Draper v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 
327 (1959), provides a suitable benchmark. While 
Hereford, the Government's informer in that case, did 
not state the way in which he had obtained his 
information, he reported that Draper had gone to 
Chicago the day before by train and that he would 
return to Denver by train with three ounces of heroin 
on one of two specified mornings. Moreover, Hereford 
went on to describe, with minute particularity, the 
clothes that Draper would be wearing upon his arrival 
at the Denver station. A magistrate, when confronted 
with such detail, could reasonably infer that the 
informant had gained his information In a reliable way. 
Such an inference cannot be made in the present case." 
Splnelli, supra. 
In this case, the Affidavit does not include any supporting 
Information, such as, where the contraband would be found, how it 
was packaged, or any other supporting information. 
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It has also been determined that "basis of knowledge" may be 
supported by corroborating evidence. See: Draper, supra. In 
this case, there was no Independent police Investigation, nor 
other corroborating Information contained In the Affidavit. 
The officer does not provide any supporting corroboration in 
stating that "Information from a second confidential informant 
states that Robert Holyoak distributes a large amount of cocaine, 
..." R. 12 18. The Officer testified at the Suppression Hearing 
that he did not actually obtain information from a second 
confidential informant. In addition, there is absolutely no 
basis of knowledge or veracity attributed to the informant. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "An officerfs statement 
that affiants have received reliable information from a credible 
person and believe" that heroin is stored In a home, is likewise 
inadequate. Agullar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 
L.Ed.2d 723, (1964), quoted from Gates, supra. 
In Splnelll the Court held that a hearsay affidavit must 
establsh an informant's "veracity or reliability" and his "basis 
of knowledge." Neither are present here. 
Since the "basis of knowledge" is Inadequate in this case, 
Gates provides that deficiency may be compensated for by a 
"strong showing" of veracity. 
The officer stated that "said informant has proven his 
reliability In the past four months." Is this a strong showing 
under Gates? 
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The rule is that such information, in order to be adequate, 
and subject to verification by the Court in camera, must have 
led to "arrests and convictions." State v. Woodall, 666 P.2d 364 
(WA. 1983); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 
L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). In addition, Defendant requested in camera 
verification, which was denied and will be addressed below. 
In addition, the Officer testified at the Suppression 
Hearing that this "confidential informant" had not provided him 
with information in the past In support of a search warrant. 
Therefore, the Affidavit in Support of the Search Warrant 
was deficient in both the areas of "basis of knowledge" and 
"veracity." As Gates provides, only a strong showing in one area 
overcomes a deficiency in the other. As this Court held in State 
v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1273 (1984), "... [compliance with the 
Aguller-Splnelll guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient 
basis for probable cause. Id. at 1205. The search warrant was 
deficient and the evidence obtained thereunder must be 
suppressed. 
POINT 2: 
DEPENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISCLOSURE 
OP THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT 
Defendant moved the trial court, in the alternative to 
suppressing the evidence, to order disclosure of the 
"confidential informant" in this case. Disclosure is necessary 
for two reasons: to establish whether an informant actually 
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exists, and if he does, to determine when he was in the house, 
under whose consent, whether he had an opportunity to "plant11 
evidence while in the house, etc. In effect, Defendant needed 
disclosure to prepare his defense. 
A. THE EFFECT OF INTENTIONAL FALSE INFORMATION CONTAINED 
IN AN AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A SEARCH WARRANT: 
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided the case 
of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 152, 98 S.Ct. 2674. In that 
case the Defendant made a "veracity attack" on the search 
warrant claiming that the Police Affiant had perjured himself. 
The Supreme Court held that upon a showing that the Warrant was 
knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly false on its face, the 
Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary showing of the 
information actually given to the Police Affiant. If the 
information contained in the Affidavit was in fact false and 
material, the evidence obtained pursuant to execution of the 
warrant must be suppressed. Franks was recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Nielsen, 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 
13 (Oct. 6, 1986), which was upheld on Federal grounds and not 
addressed on State Constitutional grounds. Utah State Consti-
tutional grounds are at issue here. 
It should here be noted that this entire case was conducted 
by Officer Leatham. Officer Leatham obtained the information 
from the Informant, prepared the Affidavit and Search Warrant, 
had the Warrant Issued, briefed other officers as to how the 
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"bust" would be handled. Officer Leatham had other officers 
hold defendant Holyoak in the living room while Leatham went 
into the bedroom. No one else saw the cocaine until it was in 
Leathamfs hands. R. 251* line 14, to 255 line 1. Leatham claims 
that he went straight to the cocaine, took it out and looked at 
it, then put the "cocaine" back and waited for the dogs to 
identify it before giving it to the evidence custodian. 
(R. 220, line 19-22). 
In this case, the Affidavit in support of the Warrant 
provided that the "confidential informant" was in the house on 
the morning of the search. Defendant and his sole roommate 
testified at the suppression hearing that no one was in the 
house on the morning of the search. This is clearly a 
substantial preliminary showing of intentional and/or knowing 
falsehood by the affiant. 
Because the identity of the informer in Franks was known, 
the court in Franks left undetermined the effect of a confi-
dential informant on a defective affidavit and warrant. 
"[B]ecause we are faced today with only the 
question of the integrity of the affiantfs represen-
tations as to his own activities, we need not decide 
and we In no way predetermine the difficult question 
whether a reviewing court must ever require the 
revelation of the Identity of an informant once a 
substantial preliminary showing of falsity has been 
made. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)." 
Franks v. Deleware, supra, at 170. 
One must start with the proposition that a defendant who 
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moves to suppress evidence for want of probable cause is entitled 
to a fair disposition of his motion. It must follow that if the 
Motion cannot be fairly determined without disclosing the iden-
tity of the informant, disclosure must be had or the Motion must 
be granted. Code of Pre-Arralgnment Procedure, Editor's note, 
§SS 290.4 at 574. 
B. THE RIGHT TO DISCLOSURE OP THE IDENTITY OP A 
"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT" UNDER UTAH AND FEDERAL LAW: 
The Forth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Consti-
tution and Art. I §12 & §14, Constitution of Utah, were violated 
in this case. Art. I §12, Constitution of Utah provides that any 
criminal accused shall have the right "to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him. . ." 
First, it should be stated that there was no showing that 
there was a need to keep the Informant's name confidential in 
this matter. Such privileges are now common law in this State. 
Rule 501, Utah Rules of Evidence (see: Editor's note) 
In this case, the Defendant/Appellant moved the trial court 
for disclosure of the "confidential informant." This Court has 
held that disclosure is called for in two instances. 
The Utah Supreme Court has passed on this issue several 
times, most recently in the case of State of Utah v. Chambers, 20 
U.A.R. 14 (Oct. 21, 1985). 
"There are two exceptions to the general privi-
lege of nondisclosure of an informer's identity. 
Disclosure is required (1) when the informer's 
-14-
identity is already known, and (2) when disclosure is 
essential to assure a fair determination of the 
Issues." 
STATE v. FORSHEE, 611 P.2d 1222, 124 (Utah 1980)(emphasis added) 
In McCray, supra, and earlier in Rovlaro v. U.S. , 353 U.S. 
53 (1957)3 the Supreme Court acknowledged the public interest in 
protecting the identity of confidential informants in order to 
encourage the free flow of information necessary in criminal 
prosecutions. Starting in Rovlaro, however, the Court recognized 
that the interest In anonymity must yield when disclosure would 
be relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused or is 
"essential to a fair determination of a cause." Id. at 60-61. To 
determine when the "informant's privilege must yield, trial 
court were instructed to balance the public interest against the 
defendant's right to prepare a defense." Id. at 62. 
Defendant in this case does not know who the informant is, 
however, it is Defendant's position that an informer does not 
exist and/or that this evidence was "planted." Therefore, in 
order to determine the honesty of the Affiant and/or who could 
have planted the evidence, Defendant is entitled to disclosure of 
the informant, a right to question him, and the ability to 
conduct his investigations necessary to prepare his defense. 
Clearly the Information in the affidavit, that the Informant was 
in the house the day of the search, would provide the 
Informant with the opportunity to "plant" the evidence. 
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The trial court denied the Defendant's Motion to Order 
Disclosure of the "confidential Informant," finding that none of 
the reasons for disclosure had been met. 
As the above argument shows, disclosure of the informant was 
essential to assure a fair determination of the issues involved 
in this case, and on that basis, this case must be remanded to 
the trial court with Orders to Disclose the Informant and order a 
new trial so that evidence may be put on for the Trior of Pact. 
POINT 3: 
IN THE ABSENCE OP SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE OR DISCLOSING 
THE INFORMANT'S IDENTITY, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
CONDUCTED AN IN CAMERA INTERVIEW WITH THE INFORMANT TO 
ESTABLISH THAT HE DID IN PACT EXIST AND GIVE INFORMATION 
As an alternative to the above procedures, the trial court 
had one additional procedure which It should have used in order 
to keep the informant confidential and to protect Defendant 
Holyoak's rights. That procedure would have been for the Court 
to Order that the Informant be produced In camera (secretly in 
chambers) for the purposing of the Court conducting an interview. 
There is substantial support for this method of balancing 
the rights of the parties, as the standard of disclosure under 
the McCray case 
"specifies no standard to guide the judge's 
discretion, other that that he be "satisfied" of the 
informant's reliability. Presumably this means that, 
if the officer makes a good witness, his story will 
be accepted without scrutinizing the underpinnings. 
Perhaps the vagueness of the standard is not of great 
consequence if * * * his decision Is unreviewable on 
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appeal, like the discretion on sentencing. But does 
this give the moving party a fair hearing of his 
challenge to probable cause, especially if he has made 
a substantial preliminary challenge to the very 
existence of the informer? Such an issue is not like 
the determination of sentence, for which purpose the 
judge is entitled to roam outside the record and play 
his hunches. It is the kind of issue that 
traditionally is determined on a record and is 
reviewable on appeal. Model Code of Pre-Arralgnment 
Procedure, 573-74 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975; 
Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, LaPave, 
Vol. 1, §3-3 p. 575 (1978). 
In this case there has been a substantial preliminary 
showing that the informer did not exist. For the implication is 
very simply that if someone had been in Defendant's home the 
morning of the search and arrest, Defendant would have known who 
the informer was. Such is not the case. It is not here alleged 
that the police officer perjured himself. What is alleged is 
that such is possible and that there are no constraints, no 
controls, no review of possible police misconduct. 
There is always the risk that common nondisclosure of 
"confidential informants" may conceal police perjury. As one 
commentator put it: 
Every lawyer who practices in the criminal courts 
knows that police perjury is commonplace. 
The reason is not hard to find. Policemen see 
themselves as fighting a two-front war—against 
criminals in the street and against "liberal" rules of 
law in court. All's fair in this war, including the 
use of perjury to subvert "liberal rules of law that 
might free those who "ought" to be jailed. * * * 
Far from adopting a presumption of perjury, the 
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McCray case almost guarantees wholesale police 
perjury. When his conduct is challenged as 
constituting an unreasonable search and seizure, all 
the policeman need say is that an unnamed "reliable 
informant" told him that the defendant was committing 
a crime. Henceforth, every policeman will have a 
genie-like informer to legalize his master's arrests. 
Younger, The Perjury Routine, The Nation, May 8, 
1967, pp. 596-97 
Id., at 577 
In an attempt to eliminate the problems and balance the 
Interests, the courts are increasingly turning to and endorsing 
the use of the in camera hearing. 
Many states provide in camera hearings to verify the 
informant's proffer as a matter of course, at which the 
prosecution is required to make the informant available for 
interrogation before the judge. Opportunity is afforded a 
defendant's counsel to submit in writing any questions he wants 
the Judge to ask of the informant. The judge takes the testimony 
and seals it, pending appeal. In People v. Darden, 356 N.Y.S.2d 
582, 313 N.E.2d 49 (1974), the New York Superior Court upheld the 
refusal of the suppression hearing judge to order disclosure of 
the informant's identity to the defendant, but then went on to 
say: 
In any event the court regards it as fair and 
wise, in a case such as this, where there is 
Insufficient evidence to establish probable cause 
apart from the testimony of the arresting officer as 
to communications received from an informer, when the 
issue of identity of the informer is raised at the 
suppression hearing, for the suppression Judge then to 
conduct an in camera inquiry. The prosecution should 
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be required to make the Informer available for 
Interrogation before the Judge. The prosecutor may be 
present but not the defendant or his counsel. 
Opportunity should be afforded counsel for defendant 
to submit In writing any questions which he may desire 
the Judge to put to the informer. 
* * * 
[S]uch a procedure as we have described would be 
designed to protect against the contingency, of 
legitimate concern to a defendant, that the informer 
might have been wholly Imaginary and the communication 
from him entirely fabricated. At the same time the 
legitimate interests of the police in preserving the 
anonymity of the informer would be respected. 
Such hearing is statutory in some states (Kansas and North 
Carolina) and available by common law In many others, (Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Tennessee). 
Another enlightened approach to the issue of disclosure is 
represented by the case of U.S. v. Brian, 507 P. Supp. 761 (D. 
R.I. 1981), where the Court stated: 
In a case where—because the Government's affi-
davit relies primarily on the use of confidential 
informants—defendants lack the very information that 
Franks requires for a threshold showing; where defend-
ants ... make some minimal showing of inconsistency on 
the face of the governments material which supports 
their assertion of deliberate falsehood or reckless 
disregard for the truth, the Court may, and probably 
should, conduct an In camera interview ... of the 
Informants relied upon by the Government. This 
requirement will Insure that ... defendants have some 
measure of protection from Governmental perjury and 
misstatement. Such protection is necessary for the 
same reason that a Franks hearing is necessary ..." 
U.S. v. Brian, supra, at 776. 
For additional support see generally, LaFave, supra, §3.3, 
n.320. Disclosure of Identity of Confidential Informant Under 
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Pranks v. Delaware, Search and Seizure Law Report, Vol. 10, No. 
11, December, 1983. 
The Defendant clearly made a substantial preliminary showing 
that the information contained in the Affidavit was false. There 
was no competant evidence to the contrary. The only assurance an 
innocent person has against police misconduct and perjury is the 
power (and duty) of the Court to disclose an informant, or to 
conduct an in camera interview of the confidential informant, to 
assure his existence and to verify the information given by the 
Police Affiant. 
Therefore, Defendant and Appellant Robert P. Holyoak 
respectfully asks this Court to establish by Common Law rule, the 
right of a Defendant to have independant verification of 
"confidential informants" by way of in camera hearings, pursuant 
to the facts of case, and the procedures as established by other 
courts. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Officer Leatham testified at the Suppression Hearing that 
the 'Confidential Informant1 "indicated [that] under no 
circumstances would he testify." In addition, Leatham testified 
that he would not disclose the informant under any circumstances. 
(Suppression Hearing p. 8, lines 3-6). 
Therefore, should this court decide any Issues in favor of 
Defendant/Appellant, this conviction should be and must be 
reversed. 
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In addition, this Court should establish a rule that in 
cases where informants are alleged to not exist, and other cases 
where justice requires verification of the informant and his role 
in the case, the trial court or the court hearing the Suppression 
Motion, should conduct an in camera interview with the 
"informant" for the purposes of balancing the "informer's 
privilege" with the defendant's due process rights. It is this 
modern trend which has received great acceptance from the courts 
and legal commentators alike. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Courts denial for an In 
Camera hearing, and should establish by Common Law, in this 
State, the duty of the courts to independantly verify information 
and existence of "confidential informants" by way of in camera 
Interviews. 
DATED and signed this day of February, 1987. 
JAMES G. CLARK, Attorney for 
Appellant Robert P. Holyoak 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Appellant's Brief, by first class 
mail, postage prepaid, to the Attorney for Respondent at the 
address listed below: 
David L. Wilkinson 
Earl F. Dorius 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Dated this day of February, 1987. 
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RULING of April 3, 1986, denying defendant's motion to 
suppress, or in the alternative to Order 
Disclosure of "Confidential Informant," or in the 
alternative, to Interview the informant iji camera. . . . A 
ORDER on defendant's motions to suppress, or in the 
alternative to Order Disclosure of "Confidential 
Informant," or in the alternative, "to interview 
the informant in camera . A-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT P. HOLYOAK, 
Defendant. 
Case Number C £ <Z&' ~^ % 
RULINC 
******** 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress or in the alternative 
Disclose Informant's Identity came before the court on April 1, 
1986. Having taken the matter under advisement the court denies 
defendant's motions. 
The court finds that the affidavit viewed in its 
entirety and in a common sense fashion, sets forth sufficient 
underlying circumstances to support the reliability and 
credibility of the informant and the conclusions of the affiant. 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1983). The magistrate 
issuing the warrant could conclude from the affidavit that the 
information contained therein was based on the personal 
observations of a reliable informant. Even if the affidavit on 
its face did not provide probable cause for the issuance of a 
search warrant, the court finds that any violation of defendant's 
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure was not 
substantial and was committed in good faith, 77-35-12(g)(1), 77-
23-12. At the suppression hearing no evidence was presented by 
A-l 
defendant to show a substantial violation as required by 77-35-
12(g). Even if defendant had met his burden to show a 
substantial violation, Officer Leatham gave testimony that 
established his good faith. The confidential informant told 
Officer Leatham the exact location of the cocaine (under the 
plywood in the corner of defendant's waterbed frame). The 
confidential informant also gave Officer Leatham information on 
two prior occasions that led to the prosecution of other 
suspects. Had the above been stated in the affidavit there would 
have been no question as to the sufficiency of the affidavit. 
The court further finds that neither of the 
requirements necessary to compel the disclosure of a confidential 
informant's identity are present. The identity of the informant 
is not presently known, and disclosure is not essential to assure 
a fair determination of the issues. State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d 
1222, 1224 (Utah, 1980). 
State to prepare an appropriate order. 
DATED this day of A£J^rrrSL986. , 
cc: James G. Clark 
Noall T. Wootton 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL .DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAR 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT P. HOLYOAK, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Case No. CR-86-48 
This matter came before regularly before the Court for 
hearing on the defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to 
Disclose Informant Identity on April 1, 1986. The defendant was 
present and was represented by counsel, James G. Clark. The 
State of Utah was represented by Kent M. Barry. A pre-hearing 
conference was held in the Court's chambers to discuss the order 
of presentation and burden of proof. It was decided that the 
State would proceed first with its evidence in support of the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant, and the defendant 
would then hake his evidentiary presentation in support of his 
motions. The State called one witness, Detective Brad Leatham of 
the Provo Police Department, who testified and was cross-
examined. Two witnesses testified for the defense, the defendant 
himself, and a roommate, Donna Alex. The matter was subsequently 
argued and was taken under advisement by the Court. Having 
considered the evidence presented at the hearing and the 
arguments of counsel the Court makes the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's motion to 
suppress be denied. The Court has reviewed the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant and made its ruling that under the 
circumstances of this case the affidavit viewed in its entirety 
and in a common sense fashion sufficiently set forth underlying 
circumstances to support the reliability and credibility of the 
informant and the conclusions of the affiant. Although the Court 
finds no Constitutional violation in the approval and execution 
of the search warrant, the Court further ruled that insufficient 
evidence existed to warrant suppression under Rule 12 (g) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court specificically found 
that there was no substantial violation of the defendant's 
Constitutional rights as required under Rule 12 (g) to warrant 
suppression, and also determined in any event that Officer Brad 
Leatham had established his good faith in the preparation of the 
affidavit and execution of the search warrant through his 
testimony at the suppression hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant's motion to 
disclose the identity of the confidential informant in this case 
be denied. The Court has found neither of the circumstances 
present in this case which would require disclosure of the 
informant's identity. More particularly, the Court finds that 
the informant's identity has not already been ascertained by the 
defendant in this case. Although it has been noted that the 
informant has provided information leading to the prosecution of 
other individuals for criminal offenses, at no time has the 
informant been required to divulge his testimony in this case or 
those cases, and has not been called upon to testify in any Court 
proceeding. As a result the Court finds the the State has an 
interest in the protection of the informant from potential 
retaliation, and an interest in encouraging the cooperation of 
informants with police agencies by allowing police agencies to 
honor their agreements of confidentiality with them. The Court 
specifically finds that the disclosure of the informant's 
identity is not essential to assure a fair determination of the 
issues of the case. The Court further denies the defendant's 
oral motion to compel the State to produce the informant to the 
Court for the Court to conduct an in camera examination of the 
informant. The Court has previously determined that it is 
satisfied that there is an informant and that the affidavit and 
the. cifti the overall circumstances set forth sufficiently his 
reliability and credibility. The Court has noted that the 
affidavit could have more clearly established the informant's 
reliability by having more precisely described the informant's 
prior history of assistance in prosecution, and the specifics of 
his information to the police as to where the contraband would be 
found, but has nonetheless concluded that the affidavit is not 
therefore fatally deficient under the evidence presented. 
Dated this day of April, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
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